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EAST ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS REVISITED: AN 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (1981-2001) 




   This article seeks to find out which macroeconomic variables 
played a role in the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 using a linear 
probability model built for Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, 
and Philippines. Results indicate that foreign direct investment, 
money stock, growth of exports, current account balance, and real 
interest rates seem to have played a role in the crisis in most 
countries, whereas the significance of domestic credit, inflation, and 
short-term debt relative to reserves appears to be rather weak as 
explanatory factors for the occurrence of the crisis.  
 
JEL Classification: F31;F32;F41;F47 




   Before the financial crisis that took place in mid-1997, East Asia 
was the largest growing region in the world, and a few countries 
including Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia were 
regarded as the world’s most promising countries with their double-
digit economic growth rates, prudent fiscal policies, and high rates of 
private savings. 
   The currency crisis, which began in Bangkok in mid-1997 rapidly 
spread to the rest of the r egion resulting in both currency and 
financial system crises. Foreign investors and lenders quickly pulled 
out capital from the region that had become dependent on capital 
inflows over the decades preceding the crisis. Due to the importance 
of the East Asian region in the world economy, the crisis had an 
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enormous impact on a global scale adversely affecting the financial 
markets all around the world. Local countries that suffered most from 
the crisis were Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and the 
Philippines.  In these countries, the crisis started from the currency 
crisis, and was followed by financial and economic crises
1 that 
resulted in plunges in the stock markets in the East Asian countries 
from mid-1997 to mid-1998. This has lead to severe financial sector 
difficulties, prolonged deterioration in economic activity, and 
increased unemployment during the years following the crisis. 
 
   It has been widely argued that financial liberalization, private 
sector expenditure and financing decisions, government involvement 
in the private sector, and lack of transparency in corporate sector, and 
fiscal and economic profligacy played a role in the East Asian 
financial crisis which was not possible to predict due to the fact that 
it originated from the private sector rather than the public sector and 
involved no public deficit or debt build-up (Bustelo et al 1999), 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
   In Feridun(2004) literature on financial crises is categorized into 
three mainstream models, namely first-generation models, second-
generation models, and third-generation models. 
  
   There have been numerous studies in the literature on the 
determinants of financial crises.  Empirical literature on financial 
crises can be categorized into two separate groups. The first group 
consists of studies based on a model known as “Signals Approach” 
which involves observing the behavior of a number of indicators as 
they issue signals when they exceed certain threshold values. The 
second approach is based on a logit or probit model and uses lagged 
values of early warning indicators as well as a dummy variable to 
predict crises. 
  
   Signals approach was developed by Kaminsky  et al. (1998) and 
consists of a bilateral model where a set of high frequency economic 
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variables during a specified period is compared, one at a time, with a 
crisis index  so that  when one of these variables deviates from its 
normal level beyond a specific threshold value prior to a crisis, it 
issues binary signals  for a possible currency crisis.  The signals 
approach uses information from crisis and non-crisis times and takes 
the timing of crises explicitly into account. This method makes it 
possible to evaluate the predictive powers of individual indicators 
facilitating the establishment of indicator rankings. Therefore, it is 
well suited for finding vulnerabilities in an economy as it 
immediately reveals the variable that causes the weakness.  This 
enables policy makers to develop prompt policy responses in order to 
prevent crises. T hese models work well with small samples and 
impose no restriction on the number of explanatory variables. 
Despite these advantages, in signals approach, information from each 
indicator is treated in an inefficient way since all are transformed into 
dummies. This implies that signals are equally strong regardless of 
whether an indicator just passes the threshold or exceeds it by a wide 
margin. This approach is bivariate, in that each indicator is analyzed, 
and optimal thresholds calculated, separately. Due to this nature of 
the approach,  correlations among the explanatory variables are not 
taken into account, which can affect the optimal thresholds in a 
negative way when constructing a composite leading indicator.  In 
addition, these models do not allow the application of some standard 
statistical evaluation methods, such as the significance tests, as they 
are nonparametric. 
  
   Probit and logit models,  pioneered by Frankel and Rose (1996), 
uses limited dependent variable models known as probit or logit 
regressions to identify the causes of crises. In these models, the 
currency crisis indicator is also modeled as a zero-one variable, as in 
the signal approach. However, the explanatory variables do not take 
the form of a dummy variable, but enter the model in a linear fashion. 
This approach defines a crisis indicator equal to one or zero 
depending on whether a currency crisis does or does not occur within 
the specified time period. Frankel and Rose (1996) attempted to find 
out how international debt structure and external factors affected the 
probability of currency crises.  They used a number of external, 
internal and foreign macroeconomic variables in a multivariate probit International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
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model specified for  105 developing countries, covering annual data 
from 1971 to 1992. They defined a crisis as at least 25% depreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate that also exceeds the previous year's 
depreciation level by at least 10% and constructed a dummy crisis 
variable according to that rule.  Results of their model indicate that 
the overall explanatory power of the model i s quite low with a 
pseudo R
2 measure of around 20% for all specifications. According 
to the same results,  current account and budget deficits are 
insignificant as well as most of debt composition variables, except 
for foreign direct investment. A fall in this variable by one percent of 
the debt is associated with a 3% increase in the probability of a crash. 
Results of their model suggest that the probability of a crisis 
increases when output growth and reserves are low, and domestic 
credit growth, external debt and foreign interest rates are high. They 
also found out that the  probability of a crash is higher during 
recessions and when the ratio of foreign direct investment to total 
debt is low. 
   
3. Background of the East Asian Economy 
 
   In this section, w e will provide information about economic 
background of the East Asian countries prior to the crisis. Before the 
crisis in 1997, ASEAN-5 countries had strong conventional 
macroeconomic fundamentals such as high savings, net capital 
inflows, investment, and GDP growth rates. They also had moderate 
inflation, ample foreign exchange reserves, fiscal surpluses, low 
public debts and low unemployment. As a result, no one had the 
reason to be apprehensive of an upcoming crisis in 1997.  
  
   However, as pointed out by Bustelo  et al (1999), East Asian 
countries had a number of common weaknesses. To begin with, 
financial liberalization, in terms of inadequate governmental 
regulation and prudential supervision, allowed domestic firms to 
borrow recklessly both domestically and abroad. It also increased 
fragilities in the domestic financial sector through excessive risk-
taking, high domestic and foreign exposure, inadequate bank sheets, 
maturity and currency mismatch between borrowing and lending, and 
short-term external debt. Feridun, M.   East Asian Financial Crisis Revisited: An Econometric Analysis 
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   Financial liberalization reduced the quality of risk-assessment as 
low capital adequacy limits and high legal lending limits contributed 
to bank overlending. In particular, foreign borrowing in short-term 
funds denominated in foreign currencies contributed to an excessive 
bank lending on a long-term basis in domestic currency.  
 
   As a result, balance sheets in banks and other financial institutions 
featured a growing maturity and currency mismatch between 
liabilities and assets. In the case of bank borrowing, obtaining capital 
from abroad at low interest rates on a short-term basis to lend in the 
domestic market at high interest rates on a long-term basis was 
profitable and therefore contributed, besides to the maturity 
mismatch between liabilities and assets, to a substantial short-term 
foreign debt. In the case of bank lending, due to increased 
competition in the domestic market, most banks tended to direct their 
loans to the stock market and to commercial and residential property 
market contributing to growth of an asset bubble in those sectors 
(Bustelo et al, 1999).  
  
   East Asian manufacturing firms had an easy access to credit. As a 
result, they were highly leveraged. Both borrowing respective to 
investment and debt respective to equity were abnormally high. 
Moreover, debt-to-equity ratios in the corporate sector rose in the two 
years preceding the crisis in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
  
     Both banks and firms were also excessively indebted in foreign 
short-term liabilities, while the change in foreign exchange reserves 
was not matching the latter. Furthermore, short-term foreign debt as a 
proportion of international reserves increased noticeably in Thailand 
and Malaysia 1994 and 1997.    
 
   In addition, financial liberalization contributed to substantial net 
capital inflows most of which were short-term bank loans or portfolio 
investments. High net capital inflows provoked the real appreciation 
of currency due also to differentials in inflation rates and to the US 
dollar rise, which led to significant slowdown in exports and, 
subsequently, to an increase in current account deficits.   
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4. Data and Methodology 
 
   For our study, we used a data set
2 of yearly observations that covers 
the period between 1981 and 2001. We selected o ur explanatory 
variables on the basis of previous empirical literature and financial 
crisis theories. Our study incorporates a total of eight macroeconomic 
variables
3 as indicated in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. We transformed the data 
sets into log returns in order to achieve mean-reverting relationships, 
and to make econometric testing procedures valid. 
 
   A monetary policy indicator that is used frequently in the literature 
and we included in this study is domestic credit as a percentage of 
GDP. This explanatory variable is used as an indicator of the banking 
sector as well as indicator of capital structure, indebtedness and 
riskiness of firms. As Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) point out, very 
high growth rates of domestic credit may serve as a simple indicator 
of the fragility of the banking system and the higher the domestic 
credit, the more dependent is the real economic activity on the health 
of the banking system, and the worse the effects of a crisis on the 
economy.  
  
   Another explanatory variable used quite frequently in the literature 
is the level of exports growth. Jotzo (1999) points out that declining 
volume of exports can be considered as an indication of loss of 
competitiveness of a country, possibly caused by an overvalued 
domestic currency. In our study, annual growth rate of exports of 
goods and services based on constant local currency was used as an 
indicator of the current account of the countries along with current 
account balance, which is the sum of net exports of goods, services, 
net income, and net current transfers. 
   
 
 
                                                 
2 All data are obtained from World Bank’s 2003 World Development 
Indicators CD 
3 A limitation of our study is that our model is based solely on quantitative 
variables and takes no account  of any qualitative variables. Feridun, M.   East Asian Financial Crisis Revisited: An Econometric Analysis 
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CAB-  Current account balance is the sum 
of net exports of goods, services, 
net income, and net current 




DOC+  Domestic credit to private sector 
refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector, such 
as through loans, purchases of non-
equity securities, and trade credits 
and other accounts receivable that 
establish a claim for repayment.  
Growth of 
exports 
EXPO-  Exports of goods and services 
represent the value of all goods and 
other market services provided to 
the rest of the world. They exclude 
labor and property income as well 
as transfer payments. Annual 
growth rate of exports of goods 
and services is based on constant 
local currencies. Aggregates are 




FDI+  Foreign direct investment is the 
sum of equity capital, reinvestment 
of earnings, other long-term 
capital, and short-term capital as 
shown in the balance of payments. 
This series shows net inflows in 
the reporting economy. 
                                                 
4 Explanations are taken from World Bank’s 2004 World Development 
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Inflation (CPI)  INF+  Inflation is measured by the 
consumer price index and reflects 
the annual percentage change in the 





M2+  Money stock (M2) comprise the sum 
of currency o utside banks, demand 
deposits other than those of the 
central government, and the time, 
savings, and foreign currency 
deposits of resident sectors other 
than  those of the central 
government. Gross international 
reserves comprise holdings of 
monetary gold, special drawing 
rights, and the reserves of IMF 
members held by the IMF. 
Short-term 
debt/reserves 
SDR+  Short-term debt includes all debt 
having an original maturity of one 
year or less and interest in arrears on 
long-term debt. Reserves comprise 
holdings of monetary gold, special 
drawing rights, reserves of IMF 
members held by the IMF, and 
holdings of foreign exchange under 
the control of monetary authorities. 
Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
Real interest 
rate 
RIR+  Real interest rate is the lending 
interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator. 
                                                 
5 Explanations are taken from World Bank’s 2004 World Development 
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   An important indicator used as a capital account indicator in our 
study is the money stock (M2) to gross international reserves ratio. 
As Eichengreen et al. (1995) point out, M2 is a measure of liquidity, 
and its growth indicates excess liquidity, which may invoke 
speculative attacks on the currency thus leading to a currency crisis. 
This suggestion is also supported by Dowling and Zhuang (2000) 
who affirm that rapid growth in credit induced by excessive monetary 
expansion have historically been associated with currency and 
banking crises in many countries.      We also used foreign direct 
investment as a percentage of GDP. This indicator shows net inflows 
in the reporting economy. It is  a well-known fact that East Asian 
countries had been for quite a long time on net capital inflows over 
the decade preceding the crisis. Therefore, we decided to include this 
variable in our study. 
  
   Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator. We included this variable following 
the prior empirical studies. High domestic real interest rates is known 
to reflect distress and problems in the finance sector (Zhuang and 
Dowling 2000). We also employ short-term debt/reserves ratio as a 
measure the vulnerability of the economy to speculative attacks As 
Ghosh (2000) points out, a large percentage of short-term debt in the 
context of insufficient foreign exchange reserve does make the 
economy vulnerable to speculative attacks.  Lastly, in order to 
measure the effect of inflation on the financial crises, we use 
consumer price index (CPI).  
 
   In this study, we aim at finding out whether the aforesaid variables 
played a role in the East Asian crisis of 1997 o r not, using a linear 
probability model
6. In  a linear probability model, the dependent 
variable y is a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 or 0  
depending on whether a currency crisis, does or does not occur. If the 
                                                 
6 A drawback of this method is that the number of crises in the underlying 
sample is very small in   comparison with the number of tranquil periods. As 
a result, the statistical properties of the limited   dependent regression may 
be poor. International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
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crisis takes place, the dependent variable takes the value of 1. 
Otherwise, it remains 0.  




The dependent variable is then regressed on the explanatory variables 
based on the form: 
   The literature on predicting currency crises has used the term crisis 
synonymously with speculative attacks or extreme pressure on the 
exchange rate. As a result, crisis indices have often been based on 
identifying sharp changes either in the exchange rate alone, as done 
by Frankel and Rose (1996), or in the weighted averages of exchange 
rates and reserves as done by Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 
(1998). Essentially, classifying each sample period as being in crisis 
or not depends on whether or not an index of vulnerability exceeds an 
arbitrarily chosen country specific threshold. In this study, we use the 
exchange market pressure  index
7 of Komulainen and Lukkarila 
(2003) whose crisis index includes exchange rate depreciation and 
loss of reserves, which are weighted equally. The index accurately 
captures the actual crisis that took place in 1997 in all countries. 
However, in order to improve the statistical properties of our model, 
we use a 3 -year window
8, i.e. we consider that the crisis episode 
spans a time period of 3 years following the year in which the crisis 
emerged. Descriptive statistics, for each country, are given in Tables 
2.1 to 2.5. 
 
                                                 
7 The exchange market pressure index takes the form: EMP = ?e  – 
(se/sr)*?r where  ?e denotes the   change in exchange rate and ?r in 
international reserves,  se and sr denote the standard deviation of   
exchange rate alteration and reserves, respectively. We determine the values 
of the EMP index more than   two standard deviations above the mean as a 
crisis as suggested by Komulainen  and Lukkarila (2003). 
 
8 This practice, from the statistical point of view, strongly increases the 
number of ones in the sample    thereby improving the statistical properties 
of our regressions. 
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  Table 2.1. Statistics of  Indonesia 
  INF EXPO  FDI  M2  SDR  RIR  CAB  DOC 
 Mean  0.26 57.56 -93.70  38.9920.2912.27 2.13 -39.94
 Maximum 1.00 756.42 59.46  425.67 42.8557.64 19.75  97.94 
 Minimum  0.00 -81.84-745.75 -117.21 6.49 3.72 -44.90-399.50
 Std. Dev.  0.45 204.24 228.65  116.48 11.3013.06 17.37 112.53
 
   Table 2.2. Statistics of Malaysia 
  FDI  DOC  EXPO  RIR  SDR  CAB  INF  M2 
 Mean  35.40 540.45 -38.17 -15.52  6.85 6.30 4.28 -0.63
 Maximum 781.56 11121.0 192.14 367.56  20.3910.0017.85 6.14
Minimum  -91.11 -164.03 -303.95 -202.70 -27.95 -7.36 -7.59 -16.81
 Std. Dev.  178.05 2428.0 107.23 117.77  11.43 4.49 6.26 5.12
 
     Table 2.3. Statistics of Philippines 
  RIR  CAB  M2  FDI  DOC  EXPO  INF  SDR 
 Mean  353.81 10.42 1.05 7.30 -500.79 14.32 20.45  -1.56
 Maximum  8017.7 23.50 12.88 336.68  123.57 124.42 112.59  46.63
 Minimum  -388.62 -12.96 -18.41 -464.89 -8783.9 -62.33 -54.89 -31.10
 Std. Dev.  1759.63 10.38 7.75 144.16  1927.8 51.77 50.34  15.14
 
         Table 2.4. Statistics of Singapore 
  RIR  DOC EXPOFDI  M2  CABINF SDR 
 Mean  79.02  7.01 38.76  1.89 13.25 4.38 3.53 31.68 
 Maximum 121.00 11.00 71.10 8.62 27.00 7.81 6.80 57.50 
 Minimum  40.30  -6.69  29.70 0.03 -4.30 1.77 2.00 19.80 
 Std. Dev.  25.79  4.32  10.36 2.58  7.47  2.11 1.36  9.90 
 
Table 2.5. Statistics of Thailand 
  EXPO  DOC  M2  FDI  RIR  CAB  SDR  INF 
 Maximum  34.48 18.66 15.43 274.67 394.25  3.04 94.58 13.29 
 Mean  14.98 4.72 5.44 26.21 21.78  2.03 -39.44 6.04 
 Minimum  -7.46 -17.72 -1.43 -54.37 -96.12  0.90 -388.44 -10.51 
 Std. Dev.  11.76 9.97 4.97 78.18 102.75  0.70 111.45 5.08 International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
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   In Singaporean data set, DOC and SDR are correlated with most of 
the remaining variables, so we do not include them in our model. In 
Malaysian data set, DOC is correlated with most variables, so we 
remove this variable. For the same reason, we disregard INF in the 
Thai model. In Indonesia, CAB and DOC are correlated with most of 
the remaining variables, so we eliminate these variables, and we do 
the same for SDR in Philippines for the same reason. Disregarding 
these variables does not mean that we consider that they are not 
relevant but we do that in order to avoid excessive multicollinearity.    
SDR is a variable very much correlated with another explanatory 
variables as it may be seen in the correlation matrix of Table 3.     
SDR shows high positive correlation with CAB, DOC and INF in 
Malaysia and Philippines, with DOC and M2 in Singapore, and with 
INF in Indonesia and Thailand. The highest negative correlations are 
shown with CAB and DOC in Indonesia. 
 
                         Table 3. Correlation Matrix of SDR 
  Id  My  Ph  Sg  Th 
CAB  -0.94  0.60  0.79  0.03  0.05 
DOC  -0.98  0.77  0.70  0.61  -0.28 
EXPO  -028  0.07  0.38  -0.45  -0.27 
FDI  -0.26  -0.33  -0.07  0.36  -0.14 
INF  0.45  0.50  0.42  -0.78  0.69 
M2  -0.12  0.12  -0.05  0.62  -0.50 
RIR  0.21  0.21  -0.64  0.32  0.35 
 
   Before we build our regression models, we need to appraise the 
expected signs of the coefficients of the variables. For individual 
variables, a positive coefficient means that an increase in this 
explanatory variable will cause an increase in dependent variable, 
that is, dummy dependent variable gets close to 1, which indicates a 
crisis. A negative coefficient, on the other hand, would mean that an 
increase in this variable would cause a decrease in the dummy 
dependent variable. Next, we run regressions for each country based 
on the linear probability model. Table 4 gives the results of the 
regressions. 
 Feridun, M.   East Asian Financial Crisis Revisited: An Econometric Analysis 
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Table 4. Regressions  




Singapore  RIR  0.016924  0.003833***  +  + 
  INF  -0.007592  0.013743  +  - 
  EXPO  -0.044002  0.015313**  -  - 
  FDI  0.100576  0.050588*  +  + 
  M2  -0.01041  0.008244  +  - 
  CAB  -0.091323  0.030529***  -  - 
Malaysia  FDI  0.001123  0.000639  +  + 
  M2  0.000126  3.01E-05***  +  + 
  EXPO  -0.005455  0.001840***  -  - 
  RIR  -0.001851  0.000870*  +  - 
  SDR  -0.021709  0.015975  +  - 
  CAB  0.146401  0.062320**  -  + 
  INF  -0.001087  0.001939  +  - 
Thailand  EXPO  0.034695  0.010081***  -  + 
  DOC  -0.052679  0.012421***  +  - 
  M2  0.043243  0.011080***  +  + 
  FDI  0.001037  0.000602  +  + 
  RIR  0.001163  0.000453**  +  + 
  CAB  -0.212867  0.070734**  -  - 
  SDR  0.000588  0.000455  +  + 
Indonesia  INF  0.000925  0.001262  +  + 
  EXPO  -0.000438  0.000235*  -  - 
  FDI  0.001614  0.000880*  +  + 
  M2  0.020413  0.005962***  +  + 
  SDR  0.000404  0.018419  +  + 
Philippines  RIR  0.000159  3.16E-05***  +  + 
  CAB  -0.031309  0.010324***  -  - 
  M2  0.024910  0.007214***  +  + 
  FDI  0.000752  0.000537  +  + 
  DOC  6.59E-05  2.99E-05**  +  + 
  EXPO  -0.006004  0.005836  -  - 
  INF  0.007065  0.005811  +  + 
*, **, *** Significant, respectively,at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
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   As Table 4 indicates, foreign direct investment is significant in all 
countries with correct signs. Real interest rates is significant in all 
countries, except Indonesia, with a wrong sign in Malaysia whereas 
export growth is significant in all countries with correct signs except 
in Thailand where it has a positive sign. Domestic credit is 
significant only in Philippines, and Thailand, and its sign is not in 
line with our expectations in Thailand. M2 is significant in all 
countries with correct signs except in Singapore while current 
account balance is significant in all countries except in Indonesia. It 
has correct signs in all cases except in Malaysia.  Short-term debt, on 
the other hand, is significant only in Thailand and Indonesia with 
correct signs. Inflation is significant in M alaysia, Indonesia and 
Philippines with correct signs except in Malaysia where it has a 
negative sign.  
 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the regressions. 
Table 5.  Correctness Statistics 
Variable  Significance/country  Correct 
signs/Significance  
DOC  2/2  1/2 
EXPO  5/5  4/5 
M2  4/5  4/4 
FDI  5/5  5/5 
INF  3/4  2/3 
CAB  4/4  3/4 
SDR  2/3  2/2 




   This study aimed at  identifying the macroeconomic variables that 
played a role in the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 using a set of 
yearly indicators from 1981  – 2001. It estimated separate linear 
probability models for Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, 
and Thailand. Several noteworthy conclusions emerged from the 
study.  First, increasing foreign direct investment relative t o GDP 
apparently accounts for the financial crisis in all of the five countries. Feridun, M.   East Asian Financial Crisis Revisited: An Econometric Analysis 
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This result is not surprising considering the fact that East Asian 
countries had become dependent on net capital inflows over the 
decade preceding the financial crisis of 1997.  Second, decreasing 
growth of exports played a role in the crisis in all countries except in 
Thailand where increasing growth of exports caused the crisis. This 
result is in line with the findings of the prior research in the financial 
crisis literature  which suggests that the loss of competitiveness of a 
country is likely to result in financial crisis. Similarly, deteriorating 
current account balance is significant in all countries except in 
Indonesia. It has correct signs in all cases except in Malaysia.      
Third, real interest rates is a significant factor in the financial crisis in 
all countries except Indonesia reflecting distress in the finance sector 
before the crisis.  However, decreasing real interest rates seem to 
account for the crisis in Singapore and Malaysia, which is an 
interesting and novel result. 
  
   In addition, domestic credit relative to GDP played a role in the 
crisis in Philippines and Thailand only, but the effect is not in line 
with our expectations in Thailand where decreasing domestic credit 
seems to play a role in the crisis in this country. This result is rather 
unexpected as high domestic credit relative to GDP is usually 
considered as an indicator of the fragility of the banking system and 
we expected to see this variable   playing a significant role in most of 
the East Asian countries. It is possible that credit crunch might have 
limited the amount of investment that was needed to get the economy 
moving with the normal speed.  Increased inflation, on the other 
hand, played a  role only in Indonesia and Philippines, which is an 
expected outcome. Besides, increasing M2 relative to gross 
international reserves played a role in the financial crisis in all 
countries except in Singapore where decreasing M2 caused the crisis. 
This result is in line with our expectation as  the growth of this 
variable indicates excess liquidity, which may invoke speculative 
attacks on the domestic currency. Similarly, increasing short-term 
debt relative to reserves played a role in the financial crisis only in 
Thailand and Indonesia indicating increasing vulnerability of the 
economy in these two countries to speculative attacks. In conclusion, 
the results of our study emphasize the need for careful monitoring of 
three key variables, namely M2 relative to gross international International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
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